Moving Towards Text-Based Negotiations?

By Jakob Silas Lund, 21 January 2010

The previous month was an eventful one in terms of the Security Council reform process. On December 23rd, a group of countries sent a letter to the Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, Ambassador Tanin of Afghanistan, urging him to present a composite paper. Following that, Tanin received a number of other letters concerning the process and on January 14th he replied with his own letter to all member states. This all culminated in the latest round of negotiations on January 19th and 20th in which the consequences of the letter exchanges were discussed.

During the last exchange on Security Council reform in 2009, several member states urged the facilitator, Ambassador Tanin of Afghanistan, to present a paper, which, in the words of the French representative, should highlight “the main parameters of the reform.” The suggestion of advancing to negotiations via a concrete document was at the time echoed by a range of countries. Others stated that a paper should come from a member state rather than the facilitator, while there were also countries urging caution in order not to push the process and create artificial deadlines.

In the weeks leading up to Christmas, the G4¹, along with South Africa, compiled signatures for a letter requesting Tanin to “present member states, before the second exchange of the 4th round, a text with options to serve as a basis for negotiation.” The text, the letter further requests, should reflect the progress achieved thus far in the intergovernmental negotiations as well as the proposals and positions made by member states. Furthermore, it should lead to immediate negotiations to identify “areas of convergence”—a phrase used by the Chair to urge member states to engage in constructive and forward-looking negotiation—and find a solution that could garner “the widest possible support among member states.” According to our information, 140 countries signed the letter.

As with any statement on Security Council Reform, virtually every phrase allows for multiple interpretations. “Widest possible support,” for example, can be seen as an attempt to ensure that there is overwhelming support for and acceptance of a potential solution. It could also—and this is likely closer to the intention of the group behind the letter—be seen as an acknowledgement that 128 votes (2/3 of the GA) is all that is required to amend the charter and that anything beyond that will be seen as a welcome luxury but by no means a necessity. For that reason, the 140 signatures were seen – at least by the countries initiating the letter - as an important victory on the road towards a negotiated agreement.

On January 13th, Ambassador Tanin sent out a letter to all member states. In it, he expressed his gratitude for the December 23rd letter —as well as for “others received”—and said that such letters reflect active engagement in the process. In his letter, Tanin did not, however, address the issue of a composite paper as the original letter asked for. Instead, he urged member states to make the most of the second exchange in the fourth round of negotiations by defining areas of convergence, leading to the fifth round, which would be “text-based.”

To Narrow Down or Not to Narrow Down…

While the December 23rd letter does not call for Tanin to promote or exclude any one proposal, and as such could be seen as “neutral,” it is interesting to note that there is not a single country belonging to the United for Consensus group among the signatories. This could be seen as a signal from the UFC that they consider the letter to threaten the mantra of “no artificial deadlines.” This principle is by critics seen as a sure way of stalling any progress, while the UFC itself sees it as a way to ensure that all viewpoints are taken into account and that the process is not unnecessarily rushed. Members of the UFC, apparently complained that most of them were never approached to sign the letter and they view the whole process of gathering signatures as an attempt to marginalize the UFC more than anything else. Interestingly, Spain, a member of UFC, initially supported the idea of a letter but ended up joining ranks with the rest of the UFC.

In a letter to Ambassador Tanin on January 13th, the UFC wrote that they are, as a group, open to “a document for the continuation of intergovernmental negotiations.” The letter further makes clear the UFC’s demand that a potential document from the facilitator must include all the five key issues and that it must be in “full conformity” with decisions 62/557 and 63/565, which must be seen as “the only basis for negotiations.” A UFC diplomat tells the Center that if a composite paper is indeed produced, it is of paramount importance that it does not attempt to narrow down the options or propose one specific solution.

More than 30 African countries signed the letter, but some important countries are missing from the list. It is not surprising that Egypt declined to sign on, but that Sierra Leone, Chair of Africa’s Committee of Ten, is not on the list is noteworthy. The assumption seems to be that Sierra Leone abstained out of fear of appearing biased. An African representative, in a conversation with the Center, emphasized that any potential composite paper must include the African priorities. The African Union has its 14th summit in Addis Ababa at the end of January and many are waiting to hear whether the group will come out of the summit with a softened-up approach to Security Council reform or if the Ezulwini consensus will continue to be the group’s sole answer to any question arising in the process. One African diplomat tells the Center that an “evolution” of the group’s stance is to be expected but that it is uncertain whether it will come in the near future.

Permanent Disagreement

France and the UK were the only P5 countries to sign the letter. A precarious process apparently surrounded the UK’s signature: initially, the UK had deviated from its usual collaboration with France on matters related to Security Council reform and had lobbied against the letter. Later in the process, for reasons unknown to the Center, the UK turned around and, as mentioned, ended up as one of the 140 signatories.

One diplomatic source contends that the efforts of the letter-makers should now be focused on getting the US on board; once they are in, the source speculates, it will be much easier to convince both China and Russia to join. That is easier said than done, however. The US has yet to elaborate on the “new” administration’s stance on Security Council reform and even those normally counted among the US’ partners are not sure where exactly the US stands at the moment. Both Russia and China were, reportedly, unhappy with the idea of the letter. One insider explains two reservations on behalf of some P5 countries: 1) It is premature to move to negotiations on the basis of a document because the blocs, in this insider’s opinion, have actually moved further away from each other, not closer; and 2) the process of narrowing down proposals should come from member states, not a facilitator.

Pressure is Mounting

The phrase “others received” in Tanin’s letter apparently referred to letters from the OIC, the UFC, the S5 and other groups. At the most recent debate, on January 19th and 20th, some member states complained that these other letters had not been attached to Tanin’s January 13th letter. While most countries sharing this concern aimed their criticism at the countries behind the letter, a few expressed grave discontent with the leadership of the facilitator. Germany, on the other hand, expressed its appreciation for Tanin’s leadership and urged everyone to “place great trust” in his work, adding that Germany is convinced Tanin will, with time, present a composite paper.

During the same negotiations, Pakistan, in a very expressive speech, called the G4’s actions “nebulous” and repeated several of the UFC’s key phrases such as “no artificial deadlines” and “no process of elimination.” Interestingly, Pakistan claimed to have spoken to 89 of the 140 signatories. 52 of them, according to Pakistan, said they did not share the G4’s views on Security Council reform, while only 12 did. This was countered by several other countries, among them the Kazakhstani delegate who, with a not-so subtle reference to Pakistan’s emotional outburst, rhetorically asked Pakistan whether it would be permissible for her to speak in spite of the fact that her country is a signatory to the December 23rd letter. Brazil stated that several countries agreed with the letter but didn’t sign it for a variety of reasons. Turkey complained that they were not approached by the countries behind the letter but that if they had been, they would have strongly considered signing it.

Whereas the negotiations were originally intended to be about areas of convergence, much of the talk ended up pertaining to “procedures,” which was used as a euphemism for talking about the letter. Sierra Leone, speaking on behalf of the African countries, was the first member state to bring up the areas of convergence, but it was not clear that an issue such as granting the veto to new African permanent members of the Council—deemed an area of convergence by Sierra Leone—would resonate with a majority of the GA. Japan’s outline for areas of convergence was perhaps more modest and brought in issues such a increased transparency; limiting of the veto; and expanding the Council to a “mid-twenties” size. As is the norm, countries supportive of the G4 made reference to the “vast majority” supporting an expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent category, while countries affiliated with the UFC remarked on how no such majority exists.

Looking Towards the Text-Based Next Steps

Regardless of whether the signatories of the December 23rd letter have a common stance on Security Council Reform, it is safe to say that these recent events signal a genuine desire from at least 140 member states to move towards more substantial negotiations. Optimists might say it signals the possibility of an agreement in the 64th GA. Pessimists, on the other hand, will note that the letter reveals nothing about whether there is meaningful agreement amongst the signatories on substantive reform issues such as the category of membership, the veto and other contentious questions. The debates following the debacle about the letter did not bring conclusive answers to these speculations.

The defining question right now, diplomats seem to agree, is what kind of text Tanin will present, in the case he chooses to present one at all. While the countries behind the letter are hoping for a short paper (some diplomats expressed preference for a 2-3 page document), other countries insist that any paper must include practically everything and anything that has ever been proposed with regards to Security Council reform, which would most likely bring the number of pages to at least three digits. Interestingly, there now seems to be agreement that some kind of paper—be it an “options paper”, a “composite paper,” or any alternative —is appropriate and needed to move the process forwards. And that in and of itself could prove to be one of the biggest steps towards progress seen in a long time.