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An Overview of U.N. Management ReformBy Irene Martinetti At the World Summit in September 2005, U.N. Member States agreed to some major U.N. reform proposals and to further discuss additional ones, including U.N. management reform. The reforms aim to increase the U.N.’s capability to comply with its principles, objectives and mandates more efficiently and effectively, while improving transparency, accountability, and integrity. The adopted resolution at the World Summit, widely known as the “Outcome Document,” identifies four main proposals with regards to management reform:
Management reform underpins all other reforms and, as Secretary General Kofi Annan observed: “Failure to carry through reform in any one of these areas can greatly reduce or nullify the value of reform in all the others.” Indeed, it is only through greater strategic restructuring that the U.N. can hope to restore the credibility of the organization after the instances of mismanagement and corruption brought to light by the oil-for-food scandal. Management Structure Reform The reform of the Secretariat’s managerial architecture has been one of the most contentious issues debated by the Member States. On March 7th 2006, the Secretary General (SG) issued a report entitled “Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger Organization worldwide.” In this document, Kofi Annan presented a series of propositions towards streamlining the managerial structure of the Secretariat. The reforms proposed include:
Undoubtedly the majority of the U.N. Member States agree that the current managerial structure of the Secretariat does not allow it to effectively fulfill its duties. Nevertheless, on the 28 th of April 2006, the GA’s Fifth Committee (administrative and budgetary) voted to approve a resolution proposed by South Africa, on behalf of the Group of 77 (G-77) and China, that requested the Secretariat to deliver 10 additional detailed reports to the Member States on the proposed reforms, thus delaying the U.N. Reform process. Agreement on the Secretariat’s reforms could not be reached despite the fact that the Secretary General discarded two of the more divisive proposals. The vote on the resolution came as a surprise especially because, as denounced by Austria’s representative on behalf of the European Union, “ the action represented a serious violation of the Committee’s long-standing working methods and consensus practice.” In fact, for the past twenty years it has been customary practice to approve the budget decisions by consensus rather than by vote. The point of contention between Member States regarding the reform proposals of the SG has risen out of the concern (especially by the G-77) that giving increased independence to the Secretariat in basic financial, budgetary and post reallocations could result in the countries paying the largest share of the bills (US, EU and Japan contribute more than 80% of U.N.’s total budget) to exercise more leverage on the Secretariat, and potentially the entire organization. South Africa’s Ambassador Kumalo, currently leading the G-77, described the proposed reforms as “a power grab by the developed world.” Despite the efforts to ensure that such fears will not materialize, the use of the “power of the purse” by the developed countries with the objective to push through reform in the last six months, has undeniably contributed to such a conviction. Imposing a spending cap on the U.N. budget was a tactic used by the “rich world” to bolster agreement on reform issues by using its financial clout. The rational was that by linking progress to financial incentives, the U.N.’s internal politicking, which had blocked reform in the past, could be avoided. At the adoption of the 2006-2007 budget by the GA in December of 2005, only $950 million were approved of the estimated $3.8 billion needed for the U.N. to operate. It was decided that more funds would then be approved on a monthly basis depending upon successful approval of the necessary reforms. Thus, countries perceived as being opposed to reform, in particular the G-77, would have to face the consequences of their stance. The developing countries (under the umbrella of the G-77 and with the support of China), declared their support of the reform process, but stated that such process should not be intended to “…change the intergovernmental nature of [Member States’] decision making, oversight and monitoring processes. Neither is it meant to redefine the roles and responsibilities assigned to the various Organs of the United Nations.” Speaking on behalf of the G-77 and China, South-African Ambassador Kumalo affirmed that “the Secretary General is elected by the Member States and therefore we believe that he is accountable to the General Assembly. For this reason we did not understand, or even accept, that in order for the Secretary General to carry out his duties this should be accompanied by denying the majority of Member States the right to pronounce on the administration of the United Nations.” In addition, the developing countries, lamenting that posts at senior levels seem to be monopolized by nationals from a select few states, are asking for more proposals on gender targets and geographical representation in the recruitment and promotion of the Secretariat’s staff. In an article published by the Financial Times, Kofi Annan recalls that Sir Brian Urquhart once said that there is never really a financial crisis at the U.N., only political crises. Indeed the US attempt to exert its financial influence for advancement on reform initiatives has not resulted in swift agreements on reforms, the intended outcome of its efforts. The developing countries see opposition to the reforms as their only opportunity to resist what they perceive as an increasingly overwhelming influence of the “rich world” within the U.N. Evidently, mutual disagreements on the spending cap have united countries with varying perspectives on reform, creating a counterweight to the US and its allies, detrimentally affecting progress on the reform process. Now, nearing the end of June, when the spending funds approved in December of 2005 will be near depletion, it is expected that the spending cap will be lifted. Since agreement on single issues can be achieved more easily, the negotiations on reform may have to deal with a single issue at a time instead of having all proposals presented in a compressed document for approval. This will prevent the agreements on reforms welcomed by all the Member States being blocked because they might be linked to other, more controversial proposals. While the reform of the Secretariat has been stalled by the controversy between developed and developing countries, other management reforms have made considerable progress. Restructuring of the Office for Internal Oversight Restructuring the Office of Internal Oversight is part of the effort to strengthen accountability and oversight of the U.N.. Member States have positively welcomed the SG proposal to strengthen the OIOS by providing it with more resources. Consequently, in December of 2005, the SG agreed to appoint an additional 39 positions that would contribute to increase the OIOS capacity to perform its auditory and investigatory tasks. Within the overall effort to improve the oversight capacity of the organization, an agreement has been reached to establish an independent audit advisory committee, intended to serve as a tool for the GA to increase its efficiency in exercising its oversight responsibilities. In addition, terms of reference have been prepared for an independent, external evaluation of the U.N.’s auditing, oversight and management responsibilities. The evaluation has the capacity to determine the funding for the OIOS as well as the scope and nature of its activities. In this regard, a process of the selection for an external contractor was finalized by the end of January 2006. Finally, the OIOS is to propose expansion of its services to all United Nations agencies to the General Assembly in its Annual Report, expected in the second half of 2006. Establishment of an Ethics Office An Ethics Office with independent status has formally been established, having become operational in January 2006. It is charged with the task of ensuring ethical conduct, more extensive financial disclosure for U.N. officials, and better protection for those who reveal wrongdoing within the organization. The Office has already introduced a new, official “whistleblower protection policy,” entitled “Protection against retaliation for reporting misconduct and for cooperating with duly authorized audits or investigations,” which has been in effect since January 2006. A comprehensive policy has been formulated with the purpose of expanding the range of financial disclosure that is currently required by senior officials. The policy is entitled “Financial Disclosure and Declaration of Interest Statements,” and is now under consideration at the General Assembly. Furthermore, in conjunction with the OIOS and the Fraud Prevention Officer, a policy on the prevention of fraud and corruption is being formulated. The Office will also ensure that the existing standards of conduct are applied and will ultimately develop a system-wide code of ethics for all personnel of the United Nations by incorporating ethics into staff training programs. Review of Mandates The review process that will take place of all U.N. mandates older than five years has the potential and capability to update and strengthen the program work of the United Nations, ensuring that it corresponds to the requirements of the Member States. A mandate is defined as: “a request or direction for action by the United Nations Secretariat or other implementing entities in the system, which originates in a resolution of the General Assembly or one of the other organs.” To facilitate the process, at the request of Member States, the Secretariat has compiled an electronic inventory of all the mandates, originating from resolutions of the GA, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Security Council. The Secretary General also issued a report entitled “Mandating and delivering: analysis and recommendations to facilitate the review of mandates.” The report provides a series of guidelines to be considered when reviewing the mandates, such as burdensome reporting requirements, overlap between and within organs, unwieldy and duplicative architecture for implementation and gaps between mandates and available resources. Finally, further management reform efforts promoted by the Secretariat include:
The Center for U.N. Reform Education will continue to monitor and publish more detailed reports on management reform in the upcoming months.
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