by Emanuel Evans and Lydia Swart
1 December 2008

The Fifth Committee is scheduled to meet from 3 October to 12 December 2008. Considering its heavy workload, the late issuance of certain documents, and the regretfully all too predictable disagreements among Member States, it is likely that the session will take longer than anticipated – an increasingly common occurrence in the Fifth Committee. The following provides an overview of a number of issues on the agenda and also attempts to summarize some of the proceedings so far, highlighting the dynamics among Member States as well as between Member States and the Secretariat.

PDF Version

by Emanuel Evans
18 November 2008

In the Fifth Committee, delegates are considering a draft resolution on the scale of assessments which contains a variety of proposals and models from Member States in regard to the methodology used to determine Member States’ dues for the period 2010-2012. The following provides an analysis as well as a chart comparing the various proposals as per draft resolution dated 10 November 2008, Rev. 3. A decision on which model to use would be made during the main session of the 64th General Assembly.

PDF Version

11 November 2008 (updated on 17 November 2008)

The Open-Ended Working Group on Security Council Reform (OEWG) met on 11 and 17 November 2008 for the first meeting of the 63rd GA session. The meeting had been widely anticipated by Member States - especially after September’s dramatic and confusing conclusion of the Working Group (see "Member States Renew Mandate for Working Group on Security Council Reform after Intense Discussions") - with many hoping that it would help shed light on the future process. Most comments centered on the role of the Working Group vis-à-vis the upcoming intergovernmental negotiations, the need for a framework agreement in the Working Group before moving to intergovernmental negotiations, and how and when such negotiations could be initiated.

PDF Version

by Jonas von Freiesleben
11 November 2008

The following analysis provides an update to chapter 1 on Security Council reform in the Center's publication “Managing Change at the United Nations” (April). It covers events and Member States dynamics in the Open-ended Working Group and in the Security Council during the 62nd General Assembly session, and - as the Open-ended Working Group is about to meet on 11 November 2008 - also on the road ahead.

PDF Version

Long and contentious attempts to change the structure and working methods of the Security Council are not new. The first concrete reform proposals surfaced as early as the 1950s. Then in 1965 the number of non-permanent seats was adopted, expanding the number of non-permanent seats from six to ten. Although in large part the reform grew out of a desire to accommodate the many newly independent African and Asian countries, it failed to completely satisfy the rapidly growing UN membership. The matter continued to be a subject of debate until India and other non-aligned countries tabled it in the General Assembly again in 1979. This time, however, reform efforts were primarily blocked by the contentious Cold War dynamics. It would take another 14 years and the fall of the Eastern bloc for the issue to resurface.

In 1993, Japan, India and Germany, among others, helped establish a Working Group of the General Assembly tasked with considering Security Council reform.¹ It soon became apparent, however, that discussion about expanding the Council had the instant ability to make regional rivalries flare up. For the most part, large or powerful countries that were not already permanent members of the Council, favored the inclusion of new permanent members - mainly themselves - while their regional rivals preferred adding more non-permanent seats. As a result, the debate in the Working Group quickly grew into a bitter stalemate between three main interest groups - Uniting for Consensus (UfC), Group of Four (G4), and the African Group - that would hamper efforts for years to come.²

Expansion of the Security Council is, however, only one aspect of reform. With the fall of the Eastern bloc, a group of smaller countries had begun to work - independently of the Working Group - for a reform of the working methods of the Security Council. These smaller nations were more interested in transparent decision-making and easier access to permanent members than in the struggle for seats. And although they have so far failed to formalize the rules of procedure of the Council, they have managed to push the Council to substantially change their procedures in regard to issues dealing with transparency; the Council’s relationship with troop-contributing countries; sanctions committees; the overall UN membership; the General Assembly and civil society.³

The 62nd Session of the General Assembly

Until the beginning of the 62nd General Assembly session, the debates in the Working Group had centered on the basis on which to conduct negotiations. However, a compromise agreement (A/61/47) reached at the end of the 61st session had the potential to infuse momentum into the debate. It mandated the Working Group to continue its work during the 62nd session “…so that further concrete results may be achieved, including through intergovernmental negotiations…” The term ’intergovernmental negotiations’ is critical to understanding the potential importance of this move, as it is a term usually understood at the UN as referring to actual negotiations on the composition of a decision (e.g. in this case the changes to be made in the membership of reformed Security Council). It is often linked to a move away from the traditionally consensus-building Working Group to a plenary of the General Assembly, where decisions can be more easily made by majority vote.

In terms of positions, Brazil, Germany and Japan support a speedy move to intergovernmental negotiations including an option to base these on implementing an intermediary or interim approach, in which a reform would be reviewed by a general conference after an agreed period of time at which time it could be changed.⁴ India supports a move to intergovernmental negotiations, but is against an intermediary approach. The Uniting for Consensus (UfC) faction supports an intermediary approach, but demands that framework and modalities for negotiations should be agreed upon in the Working Group before any intergovernmental negotiations can begin. The African group has been fairly muted on the issue of intergovernmental negotiations.

After the opening of the 62nd session in September 2007, the official reform talks kicked off in November with a debate in the General Assembly (A/62/PV.47-51), at which well-known positions were reiterated. As a result, the Working Group convened again on 14 December 2007 to discuss how to move the process forward towards intergovernmental negotiations. At this meeting, the President of the General Assembly and Chairman of the Working Group, Sgrjan Kerim announced the formation of a Task Force composed of Ambassadors Ismat Jahan of Bangladesh, Heraldo Muñoz of Chile, João Manuel Guerra Salgueiro of Portugal, Roble Olhaye of Djibouti and Kerim himself. The Task Force was to assist him in producing a status report on the issues facing the Working Group, conducting general mediation as well as drafting a final report of the Working Group to the General Assembly on the proposed future of the Working Group.

Following the December meeting, Germany announced that they had formed a group of Member States as part of an “overarching process.” The process, they said, would take place outside the Working Group and was aimed at producing “…a draft that identifies the ‘negotiables’ in a single draft proposal to enable the Member States to negotiate on that basis.” Since this initiative was intended to break the deadlock and create a text upon which intergovernmental negotiations could be conducted, the draft was not to be a German position paper, but rather an overall text sketching out the many diverging views, it was thought that Member States could then begin negotiations based on it.

The outcome of the “overarching process” was presented by the Cypriote ambassador in the early spring of 2008, and although Germany had played a significant part in the process it was quickly dubbed “the Cypriote proposal.” Apart from listing the positions of the three main interest groups, the text presupposed that any solution would be based on the intermediary approach noted previously; the draft met heavy criticism from the UfC faction, the African group and India. At a later meeting in the Working Group, Italy noted that although they (and the rest of the UfC group) support an intermediary approach, the Working Group should first establish a framework for further consultations, based on last year’s facilitators’ reports (A/61/47, SUP-Annex I and A/61/47, SUP-Annex IV), instead of initiating negotiations on the basis of “the Cypriote proposal,” which they dismissed as a unilateralist move. India said that “…the interim solution is not a solution but a problem,” while the African group kept a low profile. The debate left the Germans feeling rather deflated, and it appeared the process would be seriously hampered by the UfC demands. Some supporters of “the Cypriote proposal” expressed serious concern over what they perceived as a stalling tactic by the UfC.

Determined to move the process in some sort of direction, the Task Force and Kerim delivered their first report to the Working Group in the early days of summer 2008. Although it was a short and fairly pessimistic text - noting that entrenched positions continue to hamper the process - it did highlight the intermediary approach (called a “timeline perspective” in the report) as a possible way forward. The report explained that such an approach could “…identify what may be achievable in the short term […], and what would be left to revisit in a number of years through a mandatory review (in 10, 12 or 15 years, for example). […] That solution would keep avenues open to all preferred options to be reconsidered at an agreed moment in the future.” However, the report failed to solve the question of how to actually initiate intergovernmental negotiations, and on what basis to conduct these. At a meeting in the Working Group on 17 June 2008, Member States once more rehashed their well-known views on the issues, leaving the Task Force and Kerim to prepare a status report on the work and future of the Working Group for the upcoming end of the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly.

In the beginning of September, Member States met in the Working Group to discuss the recently published draft of the Task Force report. It included a recommendation to Member States that they begin intergovernmental negotiations during the 63rd General Assembly session aimed at a solution based on the widest possible agreement, which is typically understood by Member States as a solution reached through a vote. A number of countries with diverging views on reform all challenged the draft report, especially its suggestion on how to proceed during the 63rd General Assembly session. Germany, Japan, Brazil and India (G4) expressed outrage over the slow pace of the process and forcefully demanded that Member States abandon the Working Group and instead initiate intergovernmental negotiations in a plenary session of the General Assembly as soon as possible. The Italians and the UfC countered with their old argument that an agreement on the framework and modalities should be worked out in the Working group before any actual negotiations could take place, and those negotiations should preferably take place also in the Working Group. They also noted that a solution should be based on a general agreement, which, they said, would translate into consensus.

Hectic negotiations followed as the Task Force and Kerim went back to the drawing table. On Monday, 15 September 2008 - the last day of the 62nd GA session - Member States met in a final session to find a compromise solution. The stakes of the outcome were high: if they failed to reach a deal, the mandate of the Working Group would not be renewed and the Working Group would be suspended. Although the G4 seemed to prefer an overall consensus agreement with firm deadlines for initiating intergovernmental negotiations in the Working Group, they were not entirely put off by the prospects of discontinuing the group, as it would enable them to move away from what they called “the never-ending working group” and towards their own private negotiations, with a possible aim of tabling a resolution in the General Assembly. Thus, the G4 could negotiate freely, knowing that from their point of view the “worst outcome” would still be pretty good.

On the other side, the Italians and the rest of the UfC were under considerable pressure as they found themselves with little with which to bargain. Contrary to when they dismissed “the Cypriote proposal,” the faction was now suddenly faced with the real threat of dissolution of the Working Group altogether. Since the reform proposal of the UfC currently enjoys little support among the permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, France, United Kingdom and China all favor adding some permanent members to the Council instead of the regional model of the UfC), the UfC is in no hurry to initiate any form of negotiations that could eventually promote the interests of their regional rivals. Instead, they walk a fine line between working for modest progress in the Working Group, while stalling any proposal that could lead to unwarranted results. And abandoning the Working Group could force the process away from the manageable settings of the slow moving Working Group and into more uncontrollable venues such as the General Assembly.

To save the Working Group, the UfC offered to accept a move to intergovernmental negotiations in a plenary session of the GA, as long as the Working Group had agreed to a general agreement on a framework beforehand. The G4 dismissed the offer, demanding a set deadline for the commencement of intergovernmental negotiations without any preconditions. It led to chaotic scenes in the Working Group as Kerim and his Task Force scrambled to find an acceptable compromise. Finally, and with only hours to go in the 62nd session, a resolution was agreed to. The UfC - realizing that they had little to bargain with, and fearing dissolution of the Working Group - grudgingly accepted the demands of the G4. The resolution (62/557), among other, requested Member States to begin intergovernmental negotiations in an informal plenary of the General Assembly no later than 28 February 2009, “…based on proposals by Member States, in good faith, with mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent manner,” with the aim of garnering the “widest possible political acceptance” by Member States. The resolution was largely hailed as a victory for the G4.⁵

Other Developments Outside the Working Group

Concurrent to the dramatic scenes unfolding in the Working Group, the Security Council met for the first time since 1994 to publicly discuss its working methods. The meeting was convened by Belgium, which held the Council presidency for the month of August, following a request by the members of the so-called Small-Five group (S5) - Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland. The meeting was based on Presidential Note S/2006/507, and aimed at addressing issues such as the agenda, access to meetings and briefings, documentation, informal consultations, program of work, resolutions and presidential statements, subsidiary bodies and newly elected members. The meeting did not result in any formal outcome; however, according to a recent paper published by the research organization “Security Council Report”⁶ it is likely that the debate could be useful in stimulating further negotiations in the Security Council’s Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions - a group made up by both permanent and non-permanent members of the Council to review the working methods of the Council - potentially generating some kind of outcome before the end of 2008.

63rd Session of the General Assembly

According to the resolution 62/557, Member States will continue to “…address within the Open-ended Working Group the framework and modalities in order to prepare and facilitate intergovernmental negotiations […] The Chairman of the Open-Ended Working Group will present the results of these consultations to an informal plenary session of the General Assembly no later than February 1, 2008.” The resolution finally mandates the membership to commence intergovernmental negotiations in an informal plenary of the General Assembly no later than 28 February. Afghan Ambassador Dr. Zahir Tanin has been appointed facilitator for the upcoming process by the President of the General Assembly, Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann, with meetings of the Working Group scheduled to begin on Tuesday, 11 November 2008.

To this observer, the main challenge facing the Working Group at the moment is how to create a constructive dialogue that can engage the different interest groups and produce some sort of framework for the upcoming intergovernmental negotiations in February. The G4 must be convinced that it is in their interest to participate constructively in the work of the Working Group, instead of simply waiting for February. It will also be interesting to see if a new US administration in Washington will bring a fresh approach to the debate.

In any case, an agreement in the Working Group on the framework for intergovernmental negotiations can open for a fruitful dialogue in the New Year. Without it, the process towards Security Council reform risks running into the same roadblocks that have haunted the last 14 years of negotiations in the Working Group, namely the divisive dynamics between the main interest groups. A simple move to another forum will not mean much, if not accompanied by a strong will to compromise by all parties and perhaps look at other options. It will also be important to realistically discuss a solution based on an “intermediary approach,” i.e. how and if that would practically work. It will take concerted and real effort to elicit support from all corners of the membership if an agreement is to be found. For the legitimacy of the reform process and a future reformed Security Council compromise must be the order of the day.

By Lydia Swart
10 November 2008

On 30 October, an informal meeting took place on the draft resolution “Strengthening the environmental activities in the United Nations system.” Member States provided feedback on the draft resolution made available on 23 July which was a revision of the 2 May original Chairmen’s version.¹ This analysis explores the chances of this resolution being adopted by the end of this year.

PDF Version

by Emanuel Evans
6 October 2008

On Monday, 15 September 2008, the 62nd Session of the General Assembly formally ended. In his final speech as General Assembly President, Srgjan Kerim especially noted positive developments within the efforts to reform the Security Council, on management reform and on the process of System-wide Coherence. The following day, incoming president, Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann of Nicaragua, opened the 63rd General Assembly session by underscoring to Member states the need for increased democratization of the United Nations, and he outlined an ambitious plan to hold three high-level meetings on the issue during the coming session. 'Democratization of the UN' would also be one of the main themes of the general debate as world leaders met from 23 September to 29 September at the United Nations Headquarters, with many countries especially highlighting the ongoing efforts to reform the Security Council, revitalize the General Assembly and increase coherence of the UN system.

PDF Version

17 September 2008

On Monday, 15 September 2008, Member States unanimously adopted a resolution on the process of System-wide Coherence. According to the text, the membership will continue its work on System-wide Coherence, while focusing exclusively on the issues of “Delivering as One,” harmonization of business practices, funding, governance, and gender equality & the empowerment of women.

The text (document A/62/L.51) further includes a request for “…the Secretary-General, drawing on the resources and expertise of the United Nations system and building on the outcome of the triennial comprehensive policy review to provide to Member States substantive papers on the issues of funding and governance with a view to facilitating substantive action by the General Assembly within the sixty-third session.”

by Jonas von Freiesleben
16 September 2008

With only a few hours left in the 62nd Session of the General Assembly and in the face of a total collapse, Member States finally managed to broker a groundbreaking deal to renew the mandate of the Open-ended Working Group on Security Council Reform. The deal - based on consensus - includes an ambitious plan to move discussions from the Working Group to intergovernmental negotiations in the General Assembly.

PDF Version

On Friday, 12 September 2008, Member States met once more to discuss a redrafted version of the contentious report on the work and future of the Open-ended Working Group on Security Council Reform. During the hour-long afternoon meeting, however, all of the major interest groups continued to voice opposition to the work of the President of the General Assembly, Sgrjan Kerim and his Task-Force (Ambassadors Ismat Jahan of Banglasdesh, Heraldo Muñoz of Chile, Roble Olhaye of Djibouti, João M Guerra Salgueiro of Portugal) and negotiations needed to be continued throughout the weekend.

In general, members of the Group of Four (G4) called for a reform based on the “widest possible agreement” (possibly through a vote), and a set deadline for the commencement of intergovernmental negotiations to take place in a plenary session of the General Assembly. The Uniting for Consensus bloc (UfC), led vocally by Italy and Pakistan, called instead for a reform based on a “general” agreement (usually understood as a consensus solution), stated their objections to “artificial” deadlines and rejected the idea of moving away from the Working Group without having first agreed to the modalities and framework for negotiations.

Monday Morning - Last day of the 62nd GA Session

On Monday morning, it quickly became clear that Kerim and his Task-Force had been unable to find a workable solution over the weekend. Several drafts had been faxed back and forth to missions, but all had failed to bridge the views of the different factions.

The mood was therefore gloomy as ambassadors and diplomats entered Conference Room 2 at the United Nations Headquarters. In the General Assembly Hall next door, decisions on all other agenda items had been put on hold until a decision had been made on “the Question of Equitable Representation on and increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council.”

A new draft report with amendments had been put together by the GA President and his Task-Force for the morning meeting. Among others, it suggested to start intergovernmental negotiations by December in both the Working Group and in an informal General Assembly plenary. The draft was forcefully supported by the G4 on one side, while the UfC as well as several of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, on the other side, balked at the new draft and especially at the idea of moving negotiations away from the Working Group. “UfC final position […] is that the Open-Ended Working Group is the right forum for holding these negotiations,” said Italian Ambassador Giulio Terzi di Sant’Agata in his statement. He added “We propose that in para. (d) of the draft recommendation, the words “informal plenary of the General Assembly” be replaced by “Open-Ended Working Group.” The Chinese Ambassador noted that the Working Group is the only appropriate forum for negotiations on a reform of the Council, and that any solution should be based on consensus.

Nevertheless, the new draft also failed to win the necessary support and the meeting was suspended for a couple of hours. If no agreement could be found, the mandate of the Working Group would run out. This would not necessarily mean that the membership could not continue Security Council reform talks - a Member State can always table a resolution in the General Assembly - but it would mean that reform discussions would move away from the open forum of the Working Group in which all Member States are seated.

Monday Afternoon

Upon his return, Kerim announced that the report would be withdrawn as he had been unable to find a compromise solution. Several countries immediately sprung into action, with South Africa and some 50 cosponsors now presenting the report for adoption. “If someone doesn’t like it, let’s have a vote and see who it is,” South African Ambassador Dumisalo Khumalo announced.

It caused instant confusion, as Member States scrambled to get the microphone and Secretariat officials powered up the voting machines. The Italian Ambassador called for a technical roll-over resolution, while several countries spoke for and against the validity of a vote in the Working Group. The confusion became even more widespread as several Member States seemed unaware of what draft they were voting on. Especially Costa Rica and Italy forcefully requested to receive a clean, official and final version of the report before they could vote.

And in the midst of the confusion of speakers - some objecting to a vote, others loudly calling for the Chairman to close the list of speakers - Kerim quickly asked the membership if they could adopt the report by consensus. Waiting only a few seconds, he instantly lowered his gavel and declared that the meeting would move to the General Assembly. The confusion was total. Several delegates seemed unaware of what had just happened; had they just agreed to the report or had Kerim adjourned the meeting without any results achieved?

Monday Evening

At the General Assembly Hall - and after an hour of further deliberations - Kerim finally announced that he had taken ownership of the process again, and urged delegations to consensually adopt both draft report and amendments as orally corrected (Main corrections include: 1. In section C, the deadline would be 1 February 2009. 2. In section D, the words “taking into consideration the results of the Open-ended Working Group,” would be added in the first line instead of “taking note.” 3. In section D, the deadline would be 28 February 2009.)

This time the membership duly complied. Thus, with the adoption of the report (A/AC.247/2008/L.1/Rev.2), it had been decided, among others, to “continue immediately to address, within the Working Group, the framework and modalities in order to prepare and facilitate intergovernmental negotiations” on the question of reforming the Security Council.”

As well as “to commence intergovernmental negotiations in informal plenary of the Assembly during its sixty-third session, but not later than 28 February 2009, based on proposals by Member States, in good faith, with mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent manner, on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council, seeking a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by the membership.”

The decision set out the following for the basis for the negotiations: the positions and proposals of Member States, regional groups and other Member State groupings; the five key issues; categories of membership, the question of the veto, regional representation, size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Security Council, and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly; the report of the Working Group on its work during the sixty-first session of the General Assembly; and General Assembly decision 61/561 and the report of the Working Group on its work during the Assembly’s sixty-second session.

According to the Associated Press of Pakistan diplomats from the UfC group did not appear to be fully satisfied with the outcome. However, they noted that the report had validated the position they had taken in 2005 when the process began that the council’s expansion should come through a negotiated solution, not by voting which would only divide the membership.

Several other delegates described the agreement to Reuters as “historic,” saying it greatly increased the likelihood of larger and more representative Council representing the world of the 21st Century. “It means that we are now moving from discussion of procedure into discussion of substance,” said British Ambassador John Sawers.